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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2083
WILHELMINA LYLES,
               Appellant
   v.
PHILA GAS WORKS
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Civ. No. 04-cv-1561)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 10, 2005
BEFORE: ALITO, SMITH and COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed October 13, 2005)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Wilhelmina Lyles appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment to her former employer, Philadelphia Gas Works (“PGW”), in this employment
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite them here only as necessary to1
our discussion.
   Lyles’ complaint originally alleged the additional claims of discrimination on2
the basis of color and slander.  In an order entered September 3, 2004, the District Court
dismissed these claims.  As Lyles does not refer to this order in her brief, it is outside our
scope of review.  See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d
1086, 1092-93 (3d Cir. 1995).  We also note that Lyles has filed a separate suit alleging
retaliatory termination.  (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 05-207). 
2
discrimination suit.  Lyles began working for PGW in 1986 as a Junior Accounting Clerk
and was promoted to the position of Senior Accounting Clerk in February of 2002.   Lyles1
alleges that Gwen MacMullen, her immediate supervisor, constantly harassed her by
closely supervising her and criticizing her work.  Lyles, who was approximately 50 years
old at the time these events occurred, contends that she was singled out for this treatment
based on her age.  On November 20, 2002, Lyles was suspended for ten days without pay,
following an incident involving herself, MacMullen, and Anne Breyer, the department
director.  PGW contends that Lyles was suspended for insubordination when she refused
to retrieve documents from her work area for MacMullen’s review and caused a
disturbance by raising her voice and calling Breyer a liar.  Lyles asserts that she was
suspended because of her age.   The District Court granted PGW’s motion for summary2
judgment.  Lyles timely appealed.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the underlying facts and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
3motion.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary
judgment is appropriately granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A
party opposing summary judgment cannot rest upon the “mere allegations or denials of
the adverse party’s pleading” but must respond with affidavits or depositions setting forth
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) prohibits employers from
discriminating against individuals with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of age.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  We agree with the
District Court that Lyles established a prima facie case under the ADEA, because she
demonstrated that:  1) she is a member of the protected class, i.e., at least 40 years of age;
2) she is qualified for the position; 3) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and,
4) non-members of the protected class were treated more favorably.  See Sempier v.
Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995).  After a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to supply a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.  See id.   PGW claims that it
suspended Lyles for insubordination and supported this reason with an affidavit from
Anne Breyer describing the incident, a copy of an email from Lyles to her union
representative in which Lyles admitted that she did refuse to retrieve the documents, and
excerpts from Lyles’ deposition testimony stating the same.   
4To defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason, a plaintiff must point to some evidence from which a factfinder
could reasonably disbelieve the proffered reason or believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer’s action.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  Lyles contends
that insubordination was not a valid reason for her suspension and that her age was the
real reason.  According to Lyles, MacMullen often retrieved documents (including those
at issue) from Lyles’ work area without Lyles’ assistance or permission.  Lyles argues
that, because MacMullen could have retrieved the documents herself, Lyles’ refusal to
retrieve them cannot reasonably be deemed “insubordination” and that PGW’s “reason” is
therefore pretextual.  Clearly, Lyles believes that the suspension decision was
unsubstantiated and unfair.  However, even if we accept this perception as true for
discussion purposes, it is insufficient to demonstrate pretext.  The relevant question is not
whether PGW was wrong or mistaken in its decision to suspend Lyles; it is whether
Lyles’ age was more likely than not the underlying reason for the suspension.  See
Fuentes at 765.  We agree with the District Court that Lyles fails to present any evidence
to support an affirmative answer to this question.
Lyles’ pro se complaint also appears to assert a hostile work environment claim
We have not formally recognized a cause of action for hostile work environment3
under the ADEA.  As the parties do not dispute that such a cause of action exists, we
assume, without deciding, that it does for the purposes of this opinion.
5
based on allegations of ongoing harassment by MacMullen.   Assuming that such a cause3
of action exists under the ADEA, Lyles must show that the harassment was unwelcome;
that it was based on her age; that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and that there is some
basis for imposing liability on the employer.  See Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th
Cir. 1998).  See also Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2003).  In her
summary judgment response, Lyles described several confrontations between herself and
MacMullen which she asserts constitute harassment.  However, nothing in Lyles’
proffered evidence could lead a reasonable factfinder to believe that Lyles was treated
differently because of her age.  Indeed, as the District Court noted, Lyles, herself, stated
in her deposition that she “didn’t know” if age was a factor motivating MacMullen’s
actions.  On appeal, PGW argues that MacMullen’s close supervision was justified and
appropriate in light of Lyles’ unsatisfactory work and was not related in any way to her 
age.  After a careful review of the record, we agree with PGW that Lyles has failed to
state a prima facie hostile work environment claim.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 Appellant’s motion to reconsider the Clerk’s order dated June 22, 2005 is denied.
